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UNITED 'STATES v. SOLIS: HAVE THE
GOVERNIENT'S SUPERSNIFFERS




Large, intelligent dogs seem to fascinate people. This fascination
may be attributable to the genre of shows such as "Lassie" or "Rin-
Tin-Tin," or the awe a person experiences when a black Labrador
retriever thrashes through a cluster of cattails and scares up pheas-
ants hidden from human eyes. Many moviegoers thrilled to "Cool
Hand Luke" sloshing down an irrigation canal with the yelps and
howls of state tracking dogs ringing in his ears. In a recent addition
to this lore, law enforcement agencies have been using highly
trained dogs to assist them in detecting various types of drugs.'
The propriety of using drug detection dogs to establish probable
cause for search was argued in United States v. So~is.2 In holding
that the use of dogs, in itself, was a search, the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California may have hindered
government efforts to curtail the flow of illegal drugs.
The Solis case originated when an informant of "unproven reli-
ability"3 told a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) that approximately 2,000 pounds of marijuana were
hidden under the floorboards of an enclosed semitrailer parked
behind a service station in Santa Ana, California., The DEA agent
notified U.S. Customs which sent two trained dogs and their han-
dlers to the service station. After arriving at the station, the first
dog gave a positive alert twenty feet from the trailer indicating
that marijuana was inside. The second dog gave a positive alert
1. This term or the term "narcotics" is used in this article to encompass
marijuana, hashish, heroin, and heroin derivatives.
2. 393 F. Supp. 325 (CI). Cal. 1975).
3. Id. at 325.
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twenty-five feet from the trailer. Based on the dogs' alerts, a war-
rant was issued and the resulting search uncovered a large quantity
of marijuana.4
When Solis moved to suppress the marijuana, the government
relied solely on the positive responses of the two trained dogs to
establish probable cause for the search. Without deciding if the
dogs' alerts would be sufficient to establish probable cause for the
warrant, the court held that the use of the dogs was itself a search
lacking probable cause.5
In reaching the conclusion that the use of the dogs was a search,
the court compared -the use of marijuana detection dogs to the use
of the electronic bugging device in Katz v. United States.6 Katz
involved an "uninvited electronic ear"; Sois involved "the unin-
vited canine nose." Since Solis had a "reasonable and justifiable
expectation of privacy," the use of the dogs "contravened this ex-
pectation and invaded this private area."17 The court used strong
language to support its grant of Solis' motion.
In the absence of a warrant supported by probable cause, or cer-
tain recognized exceptions for a warrantless search, people living
in a free society should not, for example, be required to tolerate
intrusions into their privacy by the Government's use of electronic
monitoring equipment, high power telescopes, or the keen olfactory
powers of specially trained dogs. These and other extraordinary
information gathering devices gravely threaten each person's abil-
ity to maintain any semblance of privacy.8
Because cases similar -to Solis are sure to arise in the future,
and because courts are unable to agree on the proper way to treat
drug-sniffing dogs, the use of narcotic detection dogs is certain to
be a persistent problem. Law enforcement agencies have too much
invested in their dog training programs to placidly accept the Sois
decision. If the Sois rationale is followed in future decisions, the
use of these highly trained dogs will be severely limited. Because
the proper use of detection dogs is unclear it is necessary to discuss
4. Id. at 325-26.
5. Id. at 326-27. Having decided that the use of the dog was a search,
the court concluded that the agent's search based on the warrant was also
invalid as it was based on "fruit of the earlier illegal search."
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. 393 F. Supp. at 327.
8. Id. at 328.
the consequences of Solis and how the case may be followed or
overruled in the future.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES
The Solis decision considered the basic questions that will con-
tinue to surface in the future cases. The threshold question is
whether the use of a drug detection dog is a search per se. If using
the dog is not itself a search, -can the dog be used to establish prob-
able cause to search? Prior to Solis, the military and civilian courts
that dealt with the use of drug detection dogs did not squarely
confront this question.
While military counts have not specifically decided the issue,
there is a difference of opinion among military writers about
whether the use of a detection dog is a search. One writer insists
that using a trained narcotic detection dog is a search;" the opposing
writers maintain that using a dog to supply probable cause for a
search is not a search per se.10 The military courts have employed
a wide variety of factual situations" to avoid confronting the
9. Kinghan, Marijuana Detection Dogs as an Instrument of Search: The
Real Question, THE Amvzy LAwynm, DA PA-vI 27-50-5, 10 (May 1973). King-
ham states that "the threshold question is more basic: whether the very use
of the dog constitutes a search... should be the initial consideration .... "
Id. at 10. The use of the dog is analogous to the employment of mechanical
devices such as magnetometers and electronic bugging devices. Probable
cause must antedate the use of the marijuana detection dog. Id. at 11-12.
10. Lederer & Lederer, Admissibility of Evidence Found by Marijuana
Detection Dogs, THE Aumy LAWYEr, DA PAm 27-50-4, 12, 13 (April 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Lederer No. 1]. The Lederers state: "In light of re-
cent case law the better answer would seem to be that the dogs can indeed
supply probable cause." Id. The Lederers based their stance on the need
to curtail drug use and the fact that the use of dogs is an effective tool
for law enforcement officers in expanding their own olfactory senses. Id.
at 14.
This view may have been modified in a more recent publication even
though, arguably, use of dogs may not be a search where there is a minimal
expectation of privacy, or where dog use can be classified within a "plain
smell" situation. But in view of the high degree of similarity between the
use of dogs and the use of magnetometers in airport searches for weapons,
these writers feel that it would be "fruitless" to argue that the use of the
dogs, like magnetometers, is anything but a search. Lederer & Lederer,
Marijuana Dog Searches After United States v. Unrue, TuE Anmv LAwYER,
DA Prow 27-50-12, 6, 7 (Dec. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Lederer No. 2].
See also United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1974).
11. United States v. Neloms, 48 C.M.R. 702 (ACMR 1974) (base check-
point car search); United States v. Carson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 46 C.M.R.
203 (1973) (airport baggage search); United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R.
428 (1972), petition denied, 45 C.M.R. 928 (1972) (barracks room and car
search); United States v. Unrue, 46 C.M.R. 882 (1972), affd, 22 U.S.C.M.A.
466, 47 C.M.R. 556 (1973) (base checkpoint car search).
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threshold question. In one case involving an automobile search at a
base checkpoint, the court coupled circumstances indicating a les-
sened expectation of privacy with a showing of "military necessity"
to allow the dog search.12 In a similar situation, without evidence
of "military necessity," the court determined that the method of
search involving a dog went beyond the scope of the original pur-
pose for stopping vehicles at a checkpoint.13 In a dog search at
a military airport, the court seized upon the facts that the baggage
had not been committed to the control of the airport baggage area
and that the officers involved had an opportunity to receive an on-
the-spot authorization but failed to do so.14 In another case, the
court assumed arguendo that a trained dog could be used to supply
probable cause, but the court did so only to hold that probable cause
was not established because there was an insufficient showing of
the dog's reliability to the authorizing officer.' 5
Despite these courts' failure to confront the threshold issue, they
may have reached the conclusion sub silentio that the use of a
trained dog is a search. Generally, these cases have groped for
exigent circumstances to justify the dog searches. This rationale
12. United States v. Unrue, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 466, 467-70, 47 C.M.R. 556, 557-
60 (1973). At an initial checkpoint, the attention of the occupants of the
car in which the defendant was riding was directed to a large sign under
which was placed an "amnesty" barrel. The occupants were informed by
the sign that they could drop any drugs into the barrel with "no questions
asked." The court placed great emphasis on '"military necessity" caused by
a high rate of drug infiltration onto the post and a corresponding rise in
drug related offenses. Id. But see dissenting opinion of Judge Duncan,
id. at 471, 47 C.M.R. at 561.
13. United States v. Neloms, 48 C.MR. 702, 704-09 (ACMR 1974). Here
there was no '%mnesty" barrel, and only every fifth car was stopped. The
pivotal facts here were that there was no evidence of a drug problem like
that in Unrue and the occupants of the car were ordered to leave the doors
of the car ajar to facilitate the dog's search. The court determined that the
use of the dog was reasonable but this was not discussed further because
the case revolved around the "unreasonable requirement to leave the doors
ajar." Id. at 709.
14. United States v. Carson, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 205-07, 46 C.M.R. 203, 205-
07 (1973). The court never really addressed itself to the propriety of the
use of the dog.
15. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 433-34 (1972). A trained dog
was used to search the defendant's barracks room and his car after defend-
ant allegedly sold marijuana to an undercover civilian policeman. The
court's assumption arguendo that dogs might be used to establish probable
cause for a search was based on the analogous use of tracking dogs and the
cases allowing the admission of tracking dog evidence. Id. at 434.
would not be needed if the use of the dog was not a search. For
example, in United States v. Carson,16 the court required a prior
authorization-the equivalent of a search warrant-to justify a dog
search.17 In finding "military necessity" to justify a dog search,
the court seems to be implying that the search without a warrant
would be improper if there were no finding of such a necessity.18
The emphasis that the courts placed on the reliability of the dogs
may have been designed to insure that when an invasion of privacy
is initiated, it must be undertaken with a dog -that at least would
be sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause. 19
The civilian courts handling the threshold question prior to Solis
have not been any more explicit.20 When Solis was decided, there
was some confusion as to how drug detection dogs could be used
consistently with the fourth amendment. The courts may have
unconsciously confronted the threshold question in deciding the
probable cause issue. These cases, however, may have simply
assumed that 'the use of the detector dog was not a search.
THE TRAInING AND RESL mrrZ OF DRUG DETECTION DOGS
An examination of the training and reliability of detection dogs
provides insight into the question of whether the use of the dog
is a search per se or is an appropriate means of establishing prob-
able cause. The use of dogs to detect narcotics is the offshoot of
the use of tracking dogs to apprehend fugitives and suspected crimi-
nals-an accepted practice in many jurisdictions.21 The U.S. Cus-
toms Service and the Department of Defense have led the develop-
ment of training programs for detector dogs.22
16. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 46 C.M.R. 203 (1973).
17. Id. at 205-07, 46 C.M.R. at 205-07.
18. Lederer No. 2, supra note 10, at 8.
19. Id. at 10.
20. See, United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People
v. Furman, 30 Cal. App. 3d 457, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1973). These cases in-
volved a bus depot dog search and an airport dog search in that order. In
both cases the trained dog was not used until the officers received tips from
"reliable informers." In both situations, the informants' tips were corrobo-
rated by the officers' independent investigations, and the prosecutor in each
case established an adequate foundation for the dogs' reliability as investi-
gative devices. Both cases were summarily disposed of and the idea that
use of dogs is a search was not seriously considered. 498 F.2d at 748-49;
61 Cal. App. 3d at 458-59, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
21. See generally 1 WIGMORE oN EvDENc- § 177 (3d ed. 1940); Mc-
Whorter, The Bloodhound As a Witness, 54 Am. L. REv. 109 (1920); Com-
ment, 9 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 248 (1952); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1968).
22. Savage, Drug Detector Dogs, ALL HANDs, Aug. 1973, at 46; L.A.
Times, Aug. 24, 1975, § I, at 1, col. 1. Two known U.S. Customs centers
are at Front Royal, Virginia and San Antonio, Texas. As of 1973, there
[VOL. 13: 410, 1976] Comments
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Most of the dogs23 used by the Customs Service are bought from
or donated by private owners.24  The entrance requirements are
rigid, and the dogs are screened throughout the training pro-
gram.25  During the training period, a dog will work with the
same handler so that the handler can learn which movement or
action by the dog is an indication of a drug find.26 For the dogs,
training is a hide-and-seek game. In the initial training, the trainer
tosses a packet of marijuana to the dog. This develops into a large-
scale exercise in which narcotics are hidden in open fields, buildings,
cars, and other locations dogs encounter when they graduate from
the training course.27
A dog can alert to the drug in a variety of ways; the dog can
snarl, bark, whine, or paw at a container.28 Each dog may respond
differently.29 The alert is either "true" or "dead" depending upon
whether the drug is actually at the spot the dog indicates or has
only recently been there, and all that is left is a lingering odor
caused by cigarette papers, pipes and other paraphernalia that have
been in contact with narcotics.
30
was a training center run by the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police De-
partment's K-9 Division. Until recently, the U.S. Army Land Warfare Lab-
oratory was working under a grant to train narcotics detection dogs.
According to U.S. Customs:
Detector dogs were introduced on a wide scale in September, 1970
as a major tool in the stepped up drive to halt narcotics smuggling
through border ports and at major gateways. U.S. CusToMs SERV-
ICE, CusTOMs Doe DETEcToR PROGRAM 1, in letter from Chief, Cargo
Processing Branch to Max Hansen, Sept. 23, 1975.
23. CUSTOMS, supra note 22; Lederer No. 1, supra note 10, at 12; L.A.
Times, supra note 22, at 9, col. 4. The most prominent breed used by Cus-
toms is the German shepard, but Customs also uses golden retrievers, bor-
der collies, Brittany spaniels, Labrador retrievers and various mixed
breeds.
24. L.A. Times, supra note 22, at 9, col. 4.
25. CUSTOMS, supra note 22, at 2. Only about one dog out of 130 passes
the entrance test and these dogs must exhibit "natural retrieving desire,
sensitivity, energy, willingness, inquisitiveness and boldness." To graduate,
the dog and handler must score 100 percent on a battery of tests patterned
after real-life situations. Id.
26. Id.; see Savage, Drug Detector Dogs, ALL HANDs, Aug. 1973, at 46, 47.
27. CusToMs, supra note 22, at 2.
28. United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 326 (C.D. Cal. 1975); People v. Furman, 30
Cal. App. 3d 454, 455, 106 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367 (1973).
29. CusToMs, supra note 22, at 2.
30. United States v. Unrue, 46 C.M.R. 882, 884-85 (1972), ajfd, 22 U.S.
C.M.A. 466, 47 C.M.R. 556 (1973).
These training programs provide dogs -that are valuable govern-
ment tools for drug detection3' with impressive records of reliabil-
ity.3 2 The purpose of the various training programs for drug
detection dogs is to make -the dogs as reliable as possible, but ironi-
cally the intensive training programs may result in a determination
that -the dogs are not just highly reliable informants, but are like
finely tuned machines. Classifying the dogs as machines will deter-
mine the Solis issue for other courts: the use of the dog, like the
use of a bugging device, is itself a search.
If Solis is not followed and the dogs are used to establish prob-
able cause for a search, the dog must satisfy the same constitutional
requirements as other informants. To support a showing of prob-
able cause to search, the Aguilar3 -Spineli34 test will be applied.
Under this test, the magistrate must be informed of "underlying
circumstances" which are the basis for the informant's conclusion
"that narcotics were where he claimed they were," and the
underlying circumstances that are the basis for the officer's con-
clusion that he was using a "credible" informant with "reliable"
information. 35 If the information supplied by the informant is
partially corroborated by other information the total effect must
be as dependable as a tip that has passed the -two-step standard
without corroboration. 36
Various methods of providing an index of the dog's reliability
and credibility narrow down to some basic elements. The magis-
trate should be advised of the following: the exact training the de-
tector dog has received; the standards or criteria employed in select-
ing dogs for marijuana detection training; the standards the dog was
required to meet to successfully complete his training program; the
"track record" of the dog up until the search (emphasis must be
placed on the amount of false alerts or mistakes the dog has fur-
31. See CUSTOMS, supra note 22; L.A. Times, supra note 22. The U.S.Customs Service estimates that for the fiscal year 1974 their trained dogs:[S] creened 90,500 vehicles, 4 million mail packages, and 6,052,049
units of cargo in just a fraction of the time it would have taken
customs inspectors. The dog teams accounted for the seizure of22,722 pounds of marijuana, 2,166 pounds of hashish, 25 pounds of
cocaine, 13 pounds of heroin and 2 million units of the dangerousdrugs (detected because of similar chemical properties). See Cus-
TOMS, supra.
32. United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 326 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
United States v. Unrue, 46 C.M.R. 882, 883-85 (1972); L.A. Times, supra
note 22.
33. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
34. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
35. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
36. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1969).
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nished). Only after this information has been furnished, is a
magistrate justified in issuing a warrant.3 7
There are arguments against the reliability of dogs. The situa-
tions where courts have allowed dogs to establish probable cause
to search are analogous to the use of tracking dogs to apprehend
fugitives or suspects. 38 There are objections to the latter practice.
The main arguments against the use of tracking dogs are that re-
sults are uncertain because the success of tracking dogs is dependent
on a wide range of variables, and that the legendary prowess of
tracking dogs may prejudice the trier of fact.39 Where the use of
drug detection dogs is concerned, the first objection is lessened
because a detector dog's mistake usually benefits the criminal. The
dog is only trained to smell contraband and if there are no drugs
in the iearched area or the drugs' odors are effectively disguised,
the criminal usually goes free,40 although there may be some false
alerts.41 The second objection to bloodhound evidence does not
apply to drug detection dogs unless the lore surrounding the effec-
tiveness of drug-sniffing dogs has reached proportions prejudicial to
a defendant.
Just because the use of drug detection dogs is sufficiently dif-
ferent from the use of tracking dogs, to avoid those problems does
not mean that the use of drug detection 'dogs is without its pitfalls.
Many times the possibility of a false alert will be overlooked by
a handler as will the dog's inability to differentiate between a "live"
scent and a "dead" scent. Each dog will also vary in its ability
to ignore detractors and masking agents and each dog's performance
is affected differently by working conditions and its respective
attention span. There is also a possibility that a handler may
unintentionally or otherwise prompt his dog to alert.42
Despite the decisions which allow dogs to supply probable cause
to search, maintaining that a dog is reliable enough -to establish
37. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 435, petition denied, 45 C.M.R.
928 (1972); see also Lederer No. 1, supra note 10, at 14-15.
38. See note 21 supra.
39. 1 WIGMORE ON1 EVIDENCE § 177, at 635-37 (3d ed. 1940); McVhorter,
The Bloodhound As a Witness, 54 Amv. L. REV. 109, 119-22 (1920); Comment,
9 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 248, 251-54 (1952).
40. United States v. Bronstein, 17 Cams. L. REP. 2477, 2478 (2d Cir. 1975).
41. Lederer No. 1, supra note 10, at 14-15.
42. Id. at 15.
the probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant creates a
paradoxical situation. In the attempt to train and employ a dog
that would appear to be highly reliable, the Government provides
the basis for an argument that the dog is much more similar to
mechanical surveillance equipment than to an informant. The
whole obj eat of the training courses is to provide a dog that exhibits
100 percent efficiency in the detection of drugs. This is evidenced
by the final screening process where each dog must score 100 per-
cent in a battery of tests. 43 The similarity to surveillance equip-
ment can also be seen in the close relationship between the dog
and handler. Throughout the training programs each handler is
taught how ito read his dog like a finely tuned instrument because
the dog is useless if the handler cannot detect a positive alert.44
If the use of a trained dog is sufficiently similar to mechanical
surveillance equipment to be ruled a search, there must be some
justification prior to the dog search. Before employing a detector
dog, a police officer has to procure a warrant as was required in
Katz, or the officer must attempt to bring the dog search within
one of the "well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant require-
ment.45  Without the antecedent justification, any subsequent
seizure is tainted,46 and other decisions such as Solis are inevitable.
APPLICATION OF A PLAIN SMELL DocmINE TO
A Solis SITUATION
If the odor of the marijuana is in plain smell, arguably, the use
of a detector dog is not a search47 because the defendant has not
exhibited an expectation of privacy.48 A brief overview of the
plain view doctrine is essential to an understanding of the appli-
cability of a plain smell doctrine to dog searches.
United States v. Lee49 and Ker v. California50 sowed the seeds
of the plain view doctrine. In each of these cases, the Supreme
Court decided that there was not a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment because the contraband in each case was in
43. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Solis,
393 F. Supp. 325, 328 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
46. Wong-Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See also United
States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 327 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
47. United States v. Bronstein, 17 CuM. L. REP. 2477, 2478 (2d Cir. 1975).
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
49. 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (seizure of smuggled liquor on the high seas).
50. 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (seizure of marijuana found on a kitchen coun-
ter).
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"plain view."5' Coolidge v. New Hampshire52 established the
two elements that must be met to invoke the plain view doctrine:
first, the police officer must have a prior justification for being in
the position where he obtains the view of the object; second, the
officer must discover the object inadvertently.53 The first criterion
is met as long as the police officer's presence is justified by a war-
rant, an exception to the warrant requirement, or another valid
reason. The second criterion is met if the discovery of the contra-
band was not anticipated.5 4
Cases following Coolidge have defined -the parameters of the plain
view doctrine. While it is clear that officers may not use the plain
view doctrine to conduct a general exploratory search,55 it is per-
missible to use flashlights,56 binoculars,57 and searchlights58 to
facilitate the application of the doctrine. Generally, the courts
require that the officer use his own senses; the use of flashlights
and other aids seems to be justified because they merely afford
illumination or magnification of what the officer could see other-
wise.
The lower courts have subjected the requirements of the
Coolidge test to many interpretations. Instead of requiring the ob-
ject to be in physical plain view, the lower courts employ concepts
such as "constructive sight" and "totality of circumstances."5 9
Instead of requiring that the incriminating nature of the object be
"immediately apparent," the courts use a less than probable cause
standard.60  The inadvertency requirement has either been re-
51. Id. at 43; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927). See also
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
52. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
53. Id. at 466, 467, 469.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 466.
56. United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57. United States v. M~inton, 488 F.2d 37, 38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974).
58. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
59. See United States v. Welsch, 446 F.2d 220, 223 (10th Cir. 1971); State
v. Palmer, 5 Wash. App. 405, _ 487 P.2d 627, 630-31 (1971); Comment,
Plain View-Anything But Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower Courts, 7
LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 489, 494-97 (1974).
60. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1971); Plain View,
supra note 59, at 502-04.
jected, or diluted to the point where it is dependent on what type
of objects are involved-evidence or contraband.0 1
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided
the plain smell issue, it has stated in dicta that the odor of a nar-
cotic substance detected by an officer may be very persuasive evi-
dence of probable cause for a justified warrantless search, or for
obtaining a warrant.0 2 Lower courts followed this dicta in allow-
ing drug searches based in part on the olfactory perceptions of
police officers. 63 These cases generally involve the seizure of mari-
juana or hashish because these substances have a distinguishable
odor and are easily detectable. But lower courts have also refused
to extend plain view seizures to plain smell situations by explicitly
stating that, even though the contraband was emitting an unmis-
takable odor, it was not in plain view.64
The position of -the California courts is unclear. In People v.
Marshall,65 it appeared 'that the California Supreme Court settled
the plain smell issue. The court stated that the marijuana in a
closed paper bag found in a closet could not be in plain view or
plain smell. A search was required to determine the contents of
the bag-a search which "demands a warrant." The court explicitly
dealt with the plain smell argument when it stated that no matter
how keen an officer's sense of smell may be, the officer cannot seize
the thing he smells unless he rummages through the places that
could be the sources of the odor. The officers may not do this with-
out a warrant any more than they could use a highly trained dog
61. North v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836-37 (1972); Barnato v. State, 88 Nev. 508, 512, 501
P.2d 643, 647 (1972); Plain View, supra note 59, at 509-10, 511-514.
62. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). The Supreme Court
excluded opium seized by officers after they smelled the burning drug and
searched the defendant's apartment. The evidence was excluded because
the officers failed to obtain a warrant even though they had ample oppor-
tunity to do so. Id.
63. United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Leazar,
460 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1972); Fumagalli v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th
Cir. 1970); Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); People
v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); People
v. Christensen, 2 Cal. App. 3d 546, 83 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969). See also 1
SEARcH Am SziuRP LAW REPORT No. 5, at 1 (1974).
64. United States v. Babich, 347 F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Nev. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds, 477 F.2d 242 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973).
65. 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968). An officer en-
gaged in a search of an apartment for suspects smelled marijuana emanat-
ing from a bedroom closet. Closer inspection revealed that the source of
the odor was an open cardboard box in which there was a closed paper
bag. The officer opened the bag, and seized the contraband.
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to detect contraband they reasonably believe will be found in the
premises. 66 In Guidi v. Superior Court,67 the California Supreme
Court may have limited the Marshall decision. In Guidi, govern-
ment counsel urged the court to "treat plain smell as the equivalent
of plain view," but the court side-stepped this request.68 The court
was still able to distinguish Marshall by using the abolition of the
"mere evidence rule"69 to its favor. Because the bag of hashish
on the floor of Guidi's apartment was in plain sight and the officer
was informed that the contraband was in a similar brown paper
bag, the seizure of the bag was "constitutionally reasonable.170
Arguably, this result undermines Marshall, but the Guidi court re-
fused to overrule Marshall despite the urgings of government coun-
sel and the strong dissent of Justice Mosk. 71
Notwithstanding lower court decisions to the contrary, it is
evident that in certain situations some courts will allow a police
officer to base a search or seizure on information received through
his olfactory senses.72 A search or seizure based on plain smell
may also satisfy the requirements of the Coolidge test, especially
in view of the dilution of these requirements by lower courts.73
In most dog search cases the officers failed the inadvertency
requirement because they employed the trained dogs knowing there
was a good chance they would find contraband 7 4 If plain smell
is sufficiently similar to plain view, police officers might also
employ certain aids like the use of binoculars and flashlights in
a plain view situation.7 5
The Second Circuit in United States v. Bronstein76 combined
similar justifications in order to apply a "plain smell" theory to
66. Id. at 59, 442 P.2d at 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
67. 10 Cal. 3d 1, 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973).
68. Id. at 14-16, 513 P.2d at 917-20, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693-96.
69. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
70. 10 Cal. 3d at 14-16, 513 P.2d at 917-20, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693-96.
71. Id. at 17 n.18, 19-20, 513 P.2d at 919 n.18, 921-22, 109 Cal. Rptr. at
695 n.18, 697-98.
72. See cases cited note 63 supra.
73. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
The officer had already been informed by an informer that there was mari-juana in the trailer.
75. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
76. 17 Cmsv. L. REP. 2477 (2d Cir. 1975).
a dog search. Bronstein is an even more recent civilian case deal-
ing with dog searches and the court reached its decision despite
the holding in Solis. A DEA agent in San Diego warned the DEA
in Hartford, Connecticut, that airline ticket agents had observed
"highly suspicious behavior" on the part of some passengers bound
for Hartford. The Hartford DEA agents, state police, and a trained
dog converged on the Hartford airport with a full description of
the men and -their four pieces of luggage. The dog alerted to two
of the suitcases as the cases came out on the luggage conveyer
belt.77
The appellants' contention was that the use of the dog was a
search without probable cause or a warrant. The court emphasized
that the tip was from airline employees who the west coast DEA
agent regarded as reliable. The court concluded that this was
enough cause for the agents in Hartford to make the search. The
court disposed of the threshold question when it added that this
was not a "search" but a "plain smell" situation. The court
reasoned the use of the dogs was no different from the officer's
use of his olfactory senses which would have been permissible. 8
This line of reasoning also occasioned a comparison of detector dogs
to magnetometers that are used in airport searches. The Bronstein
court distinguished these methods because a magnetometer search
is indiscriminate in that it subjects a person to a search no matter
what kind of metal he has on his person or in his baggage. A search
by a trained dog can only detect contraband, the possession of which
is an offense, and any mistake a dog makes only benefits the
crininal.7 9
Bronstein distinguished Solis on two grounds. First, Solis in-
volved a closed trailer, a "private place where there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy." Second, in Solis the dogs "were
employed in response to an informer of unproven reliability." 0
There was a concurring opinion in Bronstein by Judge Mansfield
in which he adopted the majority's idea that there was a lesser
expectation of privacy, because a person's expectation in respect
to his baggage declines as "anticipated public access to the baggage
increases." Under these circumstances, the search was reasonable,
but Judge Mansfield refused to adopt the majority's "plain smell"
theory.8 1
77. Id. Sixty pounds of marijuana were found when the luggage was
opened.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2477-78.
80. Id. at 2478.
81. Judge Mansfield maintained this was a search:
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The application of a "plain smell" doctrine to dog searches like
the theory in Bronstein stretches the imagination. The courts
cannot escape the fact -that in Solis and other cases dealing with
detection dogs, none of the officers involved was able to detect the
odor of narcotics; the drugs were not in the plain smell of the offi-
cers. The officers needed trained dogs to sniff out the contra-
band.82 The decision as to whether the use of a trained dog is
a plain smell situation depends on whether the dog is comparable
to a flashlight and binoculars, or more similar to a magnetometer
or other mechanical devices, the use of which is impermissible with-
out antecedent justification. The latter possibility seems the more
logical analogy because the dogs' training makes them finely tuned
machines.8 3 This may be a fine distinction, but the use of a dog
seems to differ in kind and degree from the use of artificial light or
magnification. Where an officer uses a flashlight or binoculars, he
still perceives the object that is viewed, but when a trained dog is
used to sniff out drugs, the odor of the drugs is never transmitted by
the dog to the officer's olfactory senses.
Judge Mansfield summed up this concept in the Bronstein case.
The use of a dog to ascertain the contents of a closed bag and the
employment of an X-ray machine or magnetometer to intrude upon
a closed -area are all nonhuman means of search. Just because
a dog search is more discriminate than a magnetometer search does
not establish a legal distinction, because -the relative accuracy of
a sensing device is not the important factor. The important fact
is that, by use of dogs or mechanical devices, police officers can
intrude into a "closed area otherwise hidden from human view,
which is the hallmark of any search."
'8 4
If the use of a drug deteotion dog is not within a "plain smell"
situation, the officers must either seek a magistrate's impartial
determination of the existence of probable cause for the use of a
dog, or attempt to fit a dog search into one of the "well-delineated
exceptions" for exigent situations. 5 In either case, the use of the
I am unable to agree with the majority that use of a marijuana
sniffing dog to ascertain the contents of a private bag amounts to
some sort of "plain smell" . . . rather than a search. Id.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325, 327 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
83. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text.
84. United States v. Bronstein, 17 Canv. L. REP. 2477, 2478 (2d Cir. 1975)
(concurring opinion).
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (.1967).
dog is superfluous because probable cause must be established
before the dog is used.
Sols AD THE Pusamrm Trmp 3N SEAcH Am SEizuRE
The rationale underlying Katz existed long before the case was
decided. The Supreme Court previously had stated that warrant-
less searches were unlawful despite the fact that there was prob-
able cause.86 Before Katz, the Supreme Court repeatedly empha-
sized that the fourth amendment demands "adherence to judicial
processes," and that searches made without prior judicial approval
are "per se unreasonable"87 unless they fall within one of the few
"well-delineated exceptions. 88
Against this backdrop, Katz had to decide what acts constituted
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In deter-
mining that the occupant of a telephone booth had a justifiable
expectation of privacy that caused electronic surveillance to be a
search, the Katz court overruled the line of cases that had required
a physical trespass of the area that the person sought to keep
private.8 9 In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan put
forth a test that represents the Katz doctrine today.0 The test
is twofold: the person must exhibit an "actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy," and the expectation must "be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' Thus, Katz extended
fourth amendment protection to electronic surveillance, and re-
defined the meaning of a search and seizure. 2
86. Id. The Constitution requires that the "deliberate impartial judgment
of a public officer" be used as a buffer between citizens and police officers.
Id., citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
87. Id. Here in note 18 the Court cites Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
486-87 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 497-99 (1958).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Here in note 19 the
Court cites Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-
77 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925).
89. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Note, Katz and the
Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's
Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. RPv. 63, 65-66 (1974); Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, 982 & n.88 (1968).
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
92. A Man's Home Is His Fort, supra note 90, at 66. See also Cranwell,
Judicial Fine Tuning of Electronic Survellance, 6 SEox HALL. L. REV. 225
(1975).
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Since Katz, the Supreme Court has seemed too ready to decide
that there was no expectation of privacy, or that in light of the
circumstances, the expectation was unreasonable.9 3 The lower
courts have also used the "expectation of privacy" terminology in
a way which supports the actions of law enforcement officers.
9 4
It seems that in a courtroom setting it is easy to misconstrue what
a defendant's subjective expectation of privacy encompassed at the
time a search was made.95 But there are other lower courts that
have attempted to strictly interpret the subjective expectation
standard.96
As required by Katz, the Solis court looked at the defendant's
actual expectation of privacy.97 The defendant met the first
requirement of Justice Harlan's test because the trailer was com-
pletely enclosed and unexposed to the public. The government
agents standing outside the trailer were not able to smell the mari-
juana, and by using the dogs, the information the agents gained
was equivalent to what they would have gained if they had opened
the trailer doors and looked inside.98 The court determined that
Solis' expectation of privacy was reasonable because the warrant-
less use of the dogs was a form of government activity that "a free
society should not.., be required to tolerate."99
Is Solis a logical extension or an aberration of Katz? While the
answer will vary according to the beliefs of the observer, the Solis
court seems to have done nothing more than employ a straightfor-
ward application of the Katz doctrine.1 00 Considering the "Or-
93. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589, 591 (1974); United States v. Dio-
nisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1973) (grand jury subpoena and voice exemp-
lars); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (tax records); Combs
v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (liquor).
94. United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1973); Ponce v. Craven, 409
F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969).
95. See, e.g., Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment and Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1,
44-45 (1975).
96. Burrows v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 238, 242-43, 529 P.2d 590, 593-94,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169-70 (1974) (search and seizure of bank records);
North v. Superior Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308-11, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 837 (1972) (jailhouse conversation).
97. 393 F. Supp. at 327.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 328.
100. Accord, People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253
wellian"101 implications of the use of trained dogs, a holding
like that in Sois may be necessary to provide a constitutional bal-
ance. A further argument in favor of Solis is that in view of the
training received by government dogs, they might easily be consid-
ered similar to forms of electronic surveillance which some com-
mentators consider always a violation of Katz without some ante-
cedent justification.102
FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF T= DOG SEARCH CASES
In most situations, the use of a drug detection dog should be a
search. This search should be unconstitutional unless there is some
antecedent justification or an exception to the warrant require-
ment. Nevertheless there will be some situations in which the use
of a detector dog does not constitute an illegal search despite the
fact that there is no supporting warrant. These situations involve
circumstances in which it can be shown that the person did not
have an actual expectation of privacy, or that in light of society's
demands, it was not reasonable. These exceptions to the warrant
requirement lend themselves to some illustrations.
Use of dogs may be justified where a person consents to the
search of his car, home, or personal effects.10 3 The same reasoning
applies to dog searches of open fields or abandoned property.104
A valid justification may be available in car and baggage searches
at border checkpoints by U.S. Customs agents since border searches
enjoy a relaxation of the probable cause requirement.10 War-
(1975). The court in Williams seemed to be suggesting a similar approach
when they upheld the suppression of narcotics uncovered during a dog
search of a baggage area at the San Diego airport. The court emphasized
the facts that the officers did not have a search warrant or probable cause,
the baggage area was closed to the public, the officers did not have permis-
sion from the airline to make the search, there was no tip from a reliable
informer, and the dog's actions had nothing to do with a search for weapons
or bombs. Id. at 349-50, 124 Cal. Rptr. 254-55.
101. United States v. Unrue, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 466, 470, 47 C.M.R. 556, 560
(1973).
102. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text. Post Katz Study,
supra note 90, at 986.
103. W. RINGEL, SEARCEs & SEIzuREs, ARRmsTs AND COlMSONS § 230
et seq. (1972). See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).Query how knowing and voluntary is the consent if the person is not ap-
prised of the effectiveness and reliability of the dog that will be used? See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
104. W. RiNGEL, supra note 103, §§ 255-56. See, e.g., Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924). Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347(1967) and the Court's statement that the fourth amendment protects
people and not places. Gedko v. Heer, 18 Cam. L. REP. 2006-07 (U.S.D.C.
W. Wisc. 1975).
105. BIUGEL, supra note 102, at §§ 167.01, 247. See, e.g., United States
V. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
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rantless dog searches at airports might be considered valid espe-
cially since -these situations are analogous to the border searches
where the airports in question are international ports of entry. 06
This theory could also be extended ,to ship cargo searches by U.S.
Customs agents at this country's international ports. It is apparent
that warrantless dog searches are not justified where the searches
involve a person's private residence or his place of business.'07
The holding in Solis also shows that in some situations even a con-
tainer, like a semitrailer, that is highly movable requires that a
warrant be procured before a dog search is undertaken. 08
CONCLUSION
The Solis court was the first to confront the threshold question
and decide that the use of a trained dog constitutes a search per
se. Until Solis, courts had either decided that dogs could supply
probable cause to search or had failed to explicitly hold this was
not a search. The training of drug detection dogs discloses that
in an effort to make the dogs reliable, the government creates
highly effective surveillance devices very similar to magnetometers
and X-ray machines. The Bronstein court distinguished Solis and
applied a "plain smell" theory to the use of a trained dog in order
to avoid calling the dog's activities a search. This theory tortures
the plain view exception beyond a reasonable extension. Unlike
Bronstein and the courts that use an objective standard to judge
a person's subjective expectation of privacy, Solis exhibits a con-
sideration of a person's subjective expectation which is what the
Katz doctrine requires. There are some situations in which dog
searches may be justified, but the situations must be based on valid
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Solis case is not an aberration of the Katz doctrine. The
case only reiterates the long-standing rule that the fourth amend-
106. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEizuRES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §§ 247.01,
250 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See, e.g., United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272
(5th Cir. 1973). The justification for dog searches at airports is different
than the justification given for airport magnetometer searches for potential
hijackers. Query what hijacking danger is presented by a passenger that
is carrying only narcotics and no weapons?
107. RUNGEL, supra note 102, § 167.01. See, e.g., United States v. Dicorvo,
37 F.2d 124, 132 (D. Conn. 1927).
108. United States v. Solis, 393 F. Supp. 325 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
ment, which was drafted to provide security for persons and prop-
erty, should be "liberally construed. ' 10 9 It may be easy to over-
look this rule when the person who expects privacy is a drug
smuggler, but the fourth amendment protects all people.110 The
fundamental question is inescapable. "Where indeed will reason-
able means to search stop and 1984 begin?""1
MAX A. HAxsEN
109. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
110. United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 479 F.2d
921 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
111. Lederer No. 2, supra note 10, at 11.
